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Abstract
We use a role-play simulation to examine how using quantitative models
influences the process and outcome of sustainability negotiations. Our
experimental approach involved 74 teams of five parties negotiating the
details of a pilot test to compost and/or recycle used paper coffee cups.
Approximately half of these negotiation teams were given a quantitative
model—a life cycle assessment (LCA). We measured both negotiation
process and outcome variables, in particular identifying favorable agree-
ments—the mutually exclusive set of agreements that either minimized
carbon dioxide emissions or maximized the parties’ collective earned
value. We found that most teams used a quantitative model; nearly half
of those cocreated their own while negotiating. In our sample, teams that
used a model, even those cocreating the model while negotiating, reached
agreement more quickly than teams not using a model. Teams that cocre-
ated the LCA reached a higher number of favorable agreements. We
observed two dominant manners of model use: using the model to test
alternatives while developing an agreement and verifying that a tentative
agreement would sufficiently reduce carbon dioxide emissions. We con-
clude that using a quantitative model during a sustainability negotiation
can help to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable agreement with-
out lengthening the negotiation duration.
Introduction and Theory
Addressing complex environmental and sustainability challenges often requires collaboration among
stakeholders to design and implement solutions. Sustainability negotiations frequently involve some
issues that are based on physical and environmental constraints and other issues that involve stakeholder
preferences. Collaborative modeling has been applied in multistakeholder environmental challenges as a
means for stakeholders to make sense of the physical world components of sustainability. However,
much remains unknown about the degree to which model use affects multistakeholder negotiations, and
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what this implies for best practices in using quantitative models. By using a serious gaming simulation to
provide repeated and comparable instances of the same contextual situation, varying only model use, this
study quantifies the influence of model use on negotiation outcomes, and identifies negotiation process
insights about how modeling can inform complex, multistakeholder negotiations.
A substantial body of work has examined the use of modeling in environmental policy applications.
Modeling enables the study of full physical systems including interrelated components (Dowlatabadi,
1995; van Delden, Seppelt, White, & Jakeman, 2011) and allows for the consideration of multiple differ-
ent futures and possibilities (Langsdale et al., 2009; Morgan, 2011). In particular, researchers who study
collaborative modeling (also called mediated modeling and cooperative modeling, among other names
(Tidwell & van den Brink, 2008) and used interchangeably herein) typically examine situations involving
complex decisions with many stakeholders. These studies are frequently set in the public sector. The
models used tend to be complex, large, and predictive in nature and are frequently dynamic. Further-
more, there is often a focus on expert modelers working alongside decision makers and stakeholders. For
example, system dynamics modelers who practice mediated or participatory modeling (Langsdale et al.,
2009; van den Belt, Schiele, & Forgie, 2013) may employ expert modelers to collaborate with stakeholders
to build a system dynamics model to address the stakeholders’ problem. Likewise, integrated assessment
researchers often work with stakeholders directly (see Mustajoki, Marttunen, Karjalainen, Hokkanen, &
Vehmas, 2013). Collaborative modeling research has focused on evaluating the participatory process.
Collaborative modeling involves the coproduction of knowledge (as defined by Funtowicz & Ravetz,
1993, 1994); some scholars identify social or participant learning as an important component of collabo-
rative modeling (Ducrot, van Paassen, Barban, Dare, & Gramaglia, 2015; McIntosh et al., 2011).
Much of the research assessing collaborative modeling utilizes a case study approach, as for example,
managing the Ria Formosa coastal zone in Portugal (Videira, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito, 2003; Videira,
van den Belt, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito, 2004) and the decisions about sage-grouse protection and land
use in Washington state (Beall & Zeoli, 2008). Videira, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito (2003) and Videira,
van den Belt, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito (2004) found that the participants credit the collaborative
modeling process with organizing their ideas and conversations. Beall and Zeoli (2008) concluded that
when stakeholders and experts learn how to work together, scientific findings can be coalesced with
long-term planning. Although the case study method has many benefits (e.g., using the actual decision
makers (see van den Belt, et al. (2013) for another example)), a drawback is this method’s inability to test
repeatedly with the same situation. Testing repeated instances in the same situation allows for statistical
analysis and enables comparison across controlled differences. Because of the complexity of the case
studies in collaborative modeling research and their protracted timeline, it is often hard to isolate con-
cepts of interest such as the manner in which a group uses a model and the impacts model use has on the
resulting outcome.
In contrast to a case study approach, serious gaming role-play simulations offer an opportunity
to identify, in a more controlled setting, the pathways of influence by which model use might impact
collective sustainability decision making. Many serious gaming studies combine unstructured social
interactions with a dynamic computer simulation (for examples, see Kuit, Mayer, & de Jong (2005),
Mayer, Carton, de Jong, Leijten, & Dammers (2004), Mayer, Meijer, Nefs, Gerretsen, & Dooghe (2010),
Meijer, Mayer, van Luipen, & Weitenberg (2012), and Nefs, Gerretsen, Dooghe, Mayer, & Meijer
(2010)). These computer simulations are central to the game and the participants’ experience with it.
Other types of serious games exist (e.g., role-play, board games, behavioral (Klabbers, 2005)). Serious
games that do not use a computer simulation can also involve scientific information (see, for example,
Schenk and Susskind (2015)); many of these are role-play simulations. Often, role-play simulations of
environmental situations are used to educate the participants (see, for example, MaKinster (2010) and
Stokes and Selin (2014)). Other role-play simulations are used to represent real-world negotiations and
study negotiators and negotiations (for examples, see Curhan, Neale, & Ross (2004), Curhan, Elfenbein,
& Kilduff (2009), Curhan & Pentland (2007), De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema (2006), and
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Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro (2008)), although these are often not set in environ-
mental or sustainability situations. Serious gaming leaves the social interactions unfettered (Corrigan,
Zon, Maij, McDonald, & Martensson, 2015), which enables the study of, as Mayer (2009) terms it, the
“chaotic and messy” collective decision process.
In the following sections, we present the methods used, the results from the 74 teams of five partici-
pants—throughout this article, we refer to the participants negotiating with each other around a table as
a “negotiating team,” not in the sense that they are organizationally a team, but rather in the more com-
mon usage that they are “two or more people working together” (“Team,” 2016)—that have played the
Cup Game, and discussion. In the section Research Design, we describe the serious game role-play simu-
lation, the experimental setup and the data we collected, and the research questions. In Research Results,
we discuss our analytical methodology and the findings, classified by negotiation process and the negoti-
ated outcome. In Discussion and Conclusions, we discuss the real-world relevance of the findings and sug-
gest future research.
Research Design
This study complements existing studies of collaborative modeling by using methods that can compare
repeated instances of the same situation. Using a serious gaming role-play simulation research design, we
use the game to identify whether using a life cycle assessment (LCA) of the carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions reduced in the new postconsumer paper coffee cup system influenced the process or outcome of
negotiations, or both. We also investigate how the authorship of the model (whether it is cocreated by
the negotiating parties or made by experts) and two different means of using the model impact these ele-
ments. In the game, teams of five negotiators are asked to make decisions about the used paper coffee
cup system, and a subset are given an LCA model.
The Simulation Design
The Cup Game is a negotiation role-play simulation loosely based on the initiative Starbucks Coffee
Company launched to recycle and/or compost used paper coffee cups wherein both recycling and com-
posting these cups entail technological uncertainty. The Cup Game’s roles and issues are informed by
workshops and interviews held in 2009 and 2010 with individuals involved in this initiative (Czaika,
2010). In these role-play simulations, each participant was randomly assigned a negotiating table and
one of the five roles at the table: a coffee retail company (the convening party), a cup manufacturing
company, a recycling company, a compost company, and a waste collection (hauling) company. Each
such group of five negotiators—called a negotiating team—sought to make decisions about an upcoming
pilot test to determine the feasibility of composting and recycling used paper coffee cups. These decisions
took the form of five issues each with two to five alternatives. Each role (party) had individualized utili-
ties—called preference points—associated with each alternative; participants were told to keep these
points confidential. For an agreement to be valid, all five parties had to meet or exceed their individual-
ized point thresholds. It was possible for teams not to reach agreement.
In approximately half of the teams, one party (the cup manufacturer) was given a life cycle assessment
(LCA) model, and the encouragement to “share it [the LCA model] with the other parties to determine
the amount of carbon dioxide saved with different alternatives for [some issues].” When, how, and
whether to share the model were left up to the discretion of the participant. In the other half of the
teams, none of the parties received an LCA model. Each team received all the data necessary for the LCA,
regardless of whether or not the team received the set of equations forming the LCA (the model). How-
ever, these data were distributed among the five parties. Participants had to decide whether, when, and
how accurately to share the LCA data they were given. The participants themselves—on some teams the
cup manufacturer alone and on others the parties collectively—determined whether or not to use a
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model; that is, a team of negotiators that was not given the model could cocreate it and a team given the
model could ignore it. Furthermore, negotiators were free to use the model however they wanted during
the negotiation.
The LCA model ruled out some alternatives on two of the issues as not fulfilling the environmental
goal that the parties were working toward—reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 110,000 lbs. (49.9
metric tons) in the pilot test. If a team’s agreement met or exceeded 110,000 pounds of CO2 savings, each
of the five parties received bonus points added to their negotiated points. Alternatively, teams could
reach this environmental goal strictly through negotiation based on their preference points. The parties
were not told outright that they share this same specific environmental target and the same reward for
reaching it, although they could establish this shared goal during their negotiation talks.
The research design forced the participants to choose between maximizing their point value and maxi-
mizing the environmental benefits of their agreement—measured in the amount of reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions. Furthermore, we designed the game such that the difference between the amount of
carbon dioxide emissions reduced in the value maximizing agreement (the second largest amount of
emissions reduction) and the amount reduced by the set of best environmental agreements (largest
reduction) could not be easily estimated without the use of a model. That is, the difference among the
environmental consequences of the alternatives is small enough that the participants could not estimate
the impact each combination of alternatives would have on the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.
Therefore, in choosing among the alternatives on the environmental issues, the parties had either to cal-
culate the emissions reduction using a LCA, or to use their respective personal utilities.
Experiment Setup and Data
The participants were diverse professionals and students in negotiation and sustainability-related fields
from different world regions. Butler (1991) demonstrated that the outcomes of student subjects matched
those of experienced professionals and Herbst and Schwarz (2011) confirmed that students trained in
negotiation perform comparably well to professional negotiators. We collected data from 370 partici-
pants grouped into 74 teams of five participants at each negotiating table. Approximately half of the 74
teams were given an LCA. Fifty-nine teams used a model (80%), with 32 teams using the given model
and 27 creating their own. Seven teams did not use the LCA they were given, and eight were neither given
an LCA nor created one (Table 1). Seventy-three teams negotiated an agreement; one team failed to
reach agreement. We include this latter team in our analyses because “no agreement” is a possible out-
come.
We collected presurvey and postsurvey responses from participants (n = 291 presurvey and n = 215
postsurvey). The survey data served to help rule out alternate explanations and to gather information
about the participants’ experience playing the Cup Game. To rule out the explanation that model useful-
ness depends on the individuals’ comfort with quantitative data and models, participants indicated their
comfort with numerical data. The presurvey also helped to establish their initial opinion about the use of
numerical data in sustainability negotiations, and their starting opinion of each role’s commitment to
sustainability. The postsurvey repeated the above measures, in addition to asking more questions about
Table 1
Distribution of Data Across Initial Condition and What the Teams Did With That Initial Condition
Used an LCA Did not use an LCA Totals
Given LCA 32 7 39
Not given LCA 27 8 35
Total 59 15 74
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their use of the LCA model, how much they trusted the data other parties shared, and their opinions
about the outcome.
Some participants were interviewed (n = 37 interviews) 1–2 weeks after the role-play simulation to
gain more insight into how they used the model or why they did not use it. The semistructured inter-
views were between 20 and 30 min, were recorded if participant permission was given, and transcribed.
The interview data helped to triangulate whether and how teams used the LCA model, to provide
insight into the nature of the conversation during the negotiation, and to elucidate participants’ opin-
ions about model use in sustainability negotiations and their opinions about the roles’ commitment to
sustainability.
Research Questions
We use our role-play simulation to investigate questions related to negotiation process and outcome. We
expect that model use will impact the negotiation by providing a structured means for the negotiators to
make sense of the alternatives they are selecting among, as researchers studying modeling, such as Dowla-
tabadi (1995), Morgan (2011), and van Delden et al. (2011), have found happens in settings other than
negotiations. We expect models to provide this structured means of assessing alternatives either while
the parties are creating an agreement package or while they are verifying a tentative agreement. Given the
similarities of the participants (e.g., in self-reported comfort with quantitative information, in self-
assessed trust for other parties, in perception of the roles’ commitment to sustainability), we can reason-
ably attribute the observed negotiation outcome and process differences to the difference between model
use and the lack of model use and differences in model authorship (i.e., cocreating a model versus using
an expert-given model).
We analyzed the data in two sets of categories: (a) the two-way comparison of model used (combining
both types of model authorship) versus no model used and (b) a three-way comparison considering
model authorship (teams that used the LCA they were given, teams that cocreated an LCA during their
negotiation, and teams that did not use a model). The category “no model used” comprises teams that
did not use the LCA they were given and those that neither received an LCA nor created one. Treating
these teams as one category is consistent with the focus of our research questions. We are interested in
comparing teams that use a model with those that do not use a model; therefore, exploring the differ-
ences between negotiators that ignored a model and those that did not cocreate one is left for future
research. To be counted as having cocreated their own model, the negotiators in a team had to report
using a model and the team must not have received the expert (given) model. For most teams, we also
observed whether they used a model during the negotiation. We collected and analyzed many of the
models cocreated by these teams; at least one contained a mistake.
Regarding the negotiation process, we hypothesize (H1a) that teams who use a model will reach agree-
ment more quickly than those who do not use a model; (H1b.1 and H1b.2) that teams who cocreate the
model will reach agreement more slowly than teams who use the given model (H1b.1) and than teams
who do not use a model (H1b.2); and (H1c) that teams who use the given model will reach agreement
more quickly than those who do not use a model. Using a given model may help the negotiators make
sense of the alternatives they are deciding among, speeding up their selection of a viable agreement.
When the negotiating parties cocreate their own model during the course of the negotiation, they are
taking time away from negotiating to create a tool to help them make sense of the alternatives. Because
of this competing use of their time, we expect that teams of negotiating parties that cocreate a model will
have longer negotiation durations than teams of negotiators that do not use a model and than teams
using the given model.
We expect that participants will use models in multiple ways. First, the negotiators can consult the
model as each new alternative is discussed and build an agreement based on the model’s output. Alterna-
tively, the negotiators can negotiate as normal and then verify that an agreement they have tentatively
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reached reduces the carbon dioxide emissions satisfactorily. A third possibility, as elaborated below, is
that some parties could use the model secretly without letting the other parties know that the model
exists, and use it for individual gain. Therefore, our second process hypothesis (H2) is that model-using
teams will use the model in one of three distinct manners: collectively to test alternatives while building
an agreement, collectively to verify a tentatively accepted agreement, and individually to benefit person-
ally (by the party introducing the model). Because model use provides more insight into the alternatives
being considered (Dowlatabadi, 1995; Morgan, 2011; van Delden et al., 2011), it is possible that a nego-
tiator could use the given model to capture more value for himself or herself. To investigate whether this
is happening, we assess the value distribution among the negotiating parties. In teams that cocreate a
model, the model logic is more transparent and discussed. Therefore, these teams are less vulnerable to
individual parties not sharing the model insights than are teams using a model given to them.
With respect to negotiation outcome, we hypothesize (H3a) that the percentage of teams who reach a
favorable agreement will be higher for teams who use a model (whether given or cocreated) than for
teams who do not use a model; favorable agreements are the set of twelve agreements that minimize car-
bon dioxide emissions and the one agreement that maximizes the negotiated value, which are mutually
exclusive. Model use will help the negotiators more clearly understand the environmental consequences
of alternatives (Dowlatabadi, 1995; Morgan, 2011; van Delden et al., 2011). With that understanding, the
parties can decide whether to maximize the environmental savings, at some detriment to the negotiated
value, or to maximize their negotiated value, at some detriment to the environmental outcome. Further-
more, when a team of negotiating parties cocreates a model for use during the negotiation, their level of
understanding of the context is higher than if they had blindly used a model given to them. Therefore,
we hypothesize (H3b.1 and H3b.2) that the percentage of teams who reach a favorable agreement will be
higher for teams who cocreate a model than for teams who use the given model (H3b.1) and than for
teams who do not use a model (H3b.2). We hypothesize (H3c) that the percentage of teams who reach a
favorable agreement will be higher for teams that use the given model than for teams that do not use a
model. Furthermore, when considering the value of the negotiated agreements, we hypothesize (H4a)
that teams who use a model (whether given or cocreated) will reach agreements with higher team scores
than those who do not use a model. Additionally, we expect that model authorship will also make a dif-
ference: we hypothesize (H4b.1 and H4b.2) that teams who cocreate a model will reach agreements with
higher team scores than those who use the given model (H4b.1) and than teams not using a model
(H4b.2), and (H4c) that teams who use the given model will reach agreements with higher team scores
than those who do not use a model. For each hypothesis, we tested the significance of our findings using
statistical analyses as described further below.
Research Results
Negotiation Duration
We hypothesized that model use and model authorship will impact the duration of the negotiations. As
stated above, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1a: Teams who use a model (whether given or cocreated) will reach agreements more
quickly than those who do not use a model.
Hypothesis 1b.1: Teams who cocreate a model will reach agreement more slowly than those who use
the given model.
Hypothesis 1b.2: Teams who cocreate a model will reach agreement more slowly than those who do
not use a model.
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Hypothesis 1c: Teams who use the given model will reach agreement more quickly than those who do
not use a model.
Use of the LCA impacted the duration of the negotiation in our sample. Teams using the LCA model,
whether using the given model or cocreating their own, had shorter mean negotiation durations than
teams not using an LCA model (see Figure 1). Using independent-samples t tests (Welch’s unequal vari-
ances), we examined the differences in duration in response to model use or model authorship, as
hypothesized above. Furthermore, we used F tests to compare the variances of these categories.
In our sample, the teams that used a model had a shorter mean negotiation duration (46.3 min) than
teams that did not use a model (51 min), offering only limited support for H1a. The means were not sta-
tistically significantly different (t = 1.079; df = 16.26; p = 0.2965), suggesting little support for H1a
(see Table 2).
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Figure 1. Negotiation Duration. Mean (diamond), median, and 25th and 75th percentiles for the model-use and authorship
categories: Used given LCA, cocreated LCA, and LCA not used. The tables not using an LCA had a longer mean and median
negotiation duration than the other model-use categories.
Table 2
Results of Testing H1a, H1b.1, H1b.2, and H1c and Test of Variances: Negotiation Durations for Comparisons of Model Use
and Authorship Categories
Comparison Means (in min)
Comparing means Comparing variances
t statistic df p-value F test
Numerator
df
Denominator
df p-value
H1a: Model used vs.
no model used
Model used 46.3
No model 51
1.079 16.26 0.2965 0.308 58 14 0.0016**
H1b.1: Cocreated vs.
used given model
Cocreated 46.8
Used given 45.8
0.406 56.593 0.6865 1.193 31 26 0.6512
H1b.2: Cocreated vs.
no model used
Cocreated 46.8
No model 51
0.9264 18.5 0.3662 0.283 26 14 0.0053**
H1c: Used given
model vs.
no model used
Used given 45.8
No model 51
1.138 18.569 0.2697 0.337 31 14 0.0115**
Note. Significance codes: **** = 0; *** = 0.001; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1.
Volume 9, Number 3, Pages 237–255 243
Czaika and Selin Taking Action to Reduce Waste
The teams that cocreated the model had to do so while negotiating (the prenegotiation preparation
period was individual). Even with this extra burden of creating a model, these teams in our sample still
had shorter mean negotiation times compared to teams not using the model. These teams that cocreated
their own model had just slightly longer mean negotiation durations (mean: 46.8 min) compared to
teams that used the given model (mean: 45.8 min), offering limited support for H1b.1. The differences
are not statistically significant, however. Indeed, we find that whereas we expected the former to take
longer negotiating—because they had to recognize the need for a model and develop it, while the latter
had only to become familiar with a given model—they actually took about the same amount of time sta-
tistically. For H1b.2, in our sample, the teams that cocreated a model had a shorter mean negotiation
duration (46.8 min) than the teams that did not use a model (51 min); this is opposite what we
expected. The difference in means is not statistically significantly different. Therefore, we find no support
for H1b.2. Table 2 delineates these results.
Of the teams that received the model, none of the participants had seen the model before the 20-min
negotiation preparation period (the time during which participants read the confidential instructions
for their roles and the general instructions for all roles). Therefore, there was a learning curve associated
with the LCA model itself. Despite this, as we expected, teams using the given model had a shorter nego-
tiation time (mean: 45.8 min) than teams not using a model (mean: 51 min) in our sample, offering
limited support for H1c. The difference in means is not significant in Welch’s unequal variances t test.
Therefore, there is little evidence supporting H1c, suggesting that the time efficiencies gained from using
the model—better understanding of the available alternatives, the reduction in the number of preference-
based issues, and the social learning from model use—were offset by the addition of the learning curve,
resulting in a statistically equivalent negotiation time for negotiation teams using the given LCA model
and those not using the LCA model. See Table 2 for statistical results.
Despite the mean durations being appreciably equal regardless of model use and model authorship, we
did observe significant differences in their variances. The teams using an LCA had a smaller variance in
their negotiation times. When teams that used the given LCA and those that cocreated an LCA are con-
sidered as a composite category (teams that used a model), the variances for the teams using a model
and those not using a model significantly differ in a two-sided F test (F = 0.30804, numerator df = 58,
denominator df = 14, p = 0.0016). Considering model authorship, the variances of the teams that cocre-
ated a model and those that used the given model are not significantly different from each other. How-
ever, the variance of each is statistically different from the variance of teams that did not use a model, in
a two-sided F test: Teams that cocreated their own model and those that did not use a model have a
significant difference in variance in a two-sided F test (F = 0.28289, numerator df = 26, denominator df
= 14, p = 0.0053), and the teams that used the given model and those that did not use a model have a
significantly different variance (F = 0.33744, numerator df = 31, denominator df = 14, p = 0.0115).
Therefore, although mean durations of negotiation do not vary in statistically significant patterns, the
variances are significantly different in H1a, H1b.2, and H1c.
Using the LCA Model for Agreement Building vs. Agreement Verification vs. Personal Gain
As stated above, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: Model-using teams will use the model in one of three distinct manners: collectively to
test alternatives while building an agreement, collectively to verify a tentatively accepted agreement,
and individually to benefit personally (by the party introducing the model).
Survey, interview, and observational data revealed how the teams used the model. We observed all
three outcomes, but in most teams, the parties used the model collectively. While the cup maker (the
party who received the model) could use the model to maximize his or her own utility by collecting data
from the other parties, plugging these data into the LCA model, and not sharing the results, this occurred
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in only a few teams. Negotiators that collectively used the model used it either to test the emissions of
alternatives during the process of developing an agreement or to verify the emissions of an agreement
tentatively agreed upon. Table 3 provides interview quotes representative of each way of using the LCA.
More teams who used the LCA to test alternatives as they built agreements achieved high team scores
than did teams who used the LCA to verify an agreement; that is, the 75th percentiles were higher in the
test alternatives group than in the verify agreement group despite their similar 50th percentiles. However,
these differences are not statistically significant. Of the teams for whom we could document how they
used the model (26), the teams who used the model to test alternatives were the only teams to reach the
value maximizing agreement.
To investigate whether some parties are gaining advantage over other parties through model use, we
investigate the value distribution among parties. We measure this by looking at the score overage, which
is the normalized number of points (utility)—for each participant, the points he/she earned divided by
the minimum number of points his/her role must attain to enter into an agreement. The thresholds for
joining an agreement differ by role. Small differences in the score overages exist within the roles depend-
ing on whether the team used the given model, cocreated a model, or did not use a model (for medians
and interquartile ranges, see Figure 2); note that the team that did not reach an agreement is included
in the data generating Figure 2, though the scale of the axis does not display this team’s 0 points. Note
that the variances are not expressly visible in Figure 2. The coffee retailer had the largest median score
Table 3
Ways to Use the Model. The Predominant TwoWays Were to Test Alternatives or to Verify Agreements, Although a Third Manner
(Self-Benefit of the Party Introducing the Model) Was Also Observed
Verify agreement “We looked at it to make sure we had the right decisions to trigger the incentive [bonus for reaching
the CO2 savings goal].”
Test alternatives “His [cup maker’s] spreadsheet kinda became our fact checking or like a litmus test tool. . . . [W]hen we
started looking at different proposals, we started looking at the Cup Maker’s spreadsheet to see
[which were] above the threshold.”
Self-benefit “He [cup maker] just went around and asked us for numbers to estimate the CO2 per ton that we
would reduce. . .. So we thought maybe there was some sort of spreadsheet he was working with
already. We don’t know if he was calculating it separately or not. . ..”
Figure 2. Role score overages by used given LCA, cocreated LCA, and LCA not used. A score overage value of 1.0 is the point
threshold to join the agreement. Model use did not substantively change the value distribution among the roles.
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overage for teams that cocreated a model and the largest variance for teams that did not use a model.
The cup maker’s (the role that was given the model and could therefore have used it secretly) median
score overage was comparable for teams using the given model and teams not using a model, and
slightly lower when the team cocreated a model. The variance of the cup maker’s score overage was the
largest for teams that did not use a model and smallest for teams that cocreated a model. The recycler
had equal medians among the three cases and the largest variance for teams that did not use a model.
Note that the recycler outlier with a normalized score under 1.0 is the individual who accepted an agree-
ment he or she should not have, as discussed below. The composter had the largest median for teams
that used the given model and the largest variance for teams that did not use a model. The hauler had
the highest median overage and largest variance on teams that did not use a model. When considering
median score overages, the coffee retailer and the hauler were most impacted by model use and author-
ship; when considering variance of the score overages, the cup maker and the composter were the most
impacted.
Favorable Agreements: Most Environmental Protection or Value Maximum
Here, we examine favorable agreements—the subset of feasible agreements that either provide the most
environmental protection or, mutually exclusively, maximize the value earned. The former is a set of
twelve agreements that minimize carbon dioxide emissions, and the latter is one agreement that maxi-
mizes agreement value (also called team score). The twelve environmental maximizing agreements each
have a lower team score than the one score maximizing agreement, and the score maximizing agreement
offers less environmental protection than the environmental maximizing agreements.
As stated above, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3a: The percentage of teams who reach a favorable agreement will be higher for teams who
use a model (whether given or cocreated) than for teams who do not use a model.
Hypothesis 3b.1: The percentage of teams who reach a favorable agreement will be higher for teams
who cocreate a model than for teams who use the given model.
Hypothesis 3b.2: The percentage of teams who reach a favorable agreement will be higher for teams
who cocreate a model than for teams who do not use a model.
Hypothesis 3c: The percentage of teams who reach a favorable agreement will be higher for teams who
use the given model than for teams who do not use a model.
The LCA model enabled the negotiators to calculate the amount of carbon dioxide their agreement
would save and thus relates to two of the five issues being negotiated. That is, the LCA model provides
information to address the physical world issues that teams not using the LCA model had to address
with preference-based information. In our sample, the percentage of teams reaching a favorable
agreement—the number of teams reaching a favorable agreement divided by the number of teams in that
category—for teams using a model (34%) was higher than for teams not using a model (27%), offering
limited support for H3a. However, Fisher’s exact test, a one-sided comparison of these, shows that they
are not statistically significant (odds ratio = 1.40, p-value = 0.4196).
Teams that cocreated their own LCA outperformed the other two categories in reaching a favorable
agreement in our sample (limited support for H3b.1 and H3b.2). The percentage of teams reaching a
favorable agreement for teams that cocreated a model (44%) and for those that used the given model
(25%) are significantly different (odds ratio = 2.36, p = 0.0975) from each other in a one-sided, 90%
Fisher’s exact test (chi-squared test of equal proportions with Yates continuity correction gives similar
results). This further and more strongly supports H3b.1. While the percentage of teams reaching a
Volume 9, Number 3, Pages 237–255246
Taking Action to Reduce Waste Czaika and Selin
favorable agreement for teams that cocreated a model (44%) was larger than for those that did not use a
model (27%), the difference is not statistically significant in a one-sided Fisher’s exact test (odds
ratio = 2.16, p = 0.2116). Therefore, we find little support for H3b.2. We do not find support for H3c:
the percentages of teams who reached a favorable agreement are statistically similar (in a one-sided Fish-
er’s Exact test) for teams that used the given model and teams that did not use a model (25% for the for-
mer; 27% for the latter). See Table 4.
In addition, two other findings should be highlighted. First, half (50%) of the cocreating teams
in our sample that reached a favorable agreement chose an environmentally favorable agreement
(over the point maximizing), compared to only 37.5% of the teams using the given model and
25% of the teams not using a model. Second, our data show that half (50%) of the teams that
did not use a model reached a unique final agreement (a final agreement not reached by any
other team in that category), compared to 38% of teams that used the given model and 41% of
teams that cocreated their own model. That is, most model-using teams reached agreements
within the same small subset of agreements. This concentration of their negotiated agreements
lends support to the finding that cocreating teams were better able to target their final agreement
to a favorable agreement.
Agreement Value
The team score of the agreement is the sum of the parties’ individual scores; it is also called the agree-
ment value. As discussed above, in the Cup Game design, the agreements that maximize the emissions
reduction do not have the highest team values (these team scores range from 590 to 695 points), and the
value maximizing agreement (765 points) offers less emissions reduction. When choosing among the set
of agreements that maximize emissions reduction, the teams would benefit from choosing an agreement
with a high score. Furthermore, the value maximizing agreement forms a ceiling for the team score data
(765) and not reaching an agreement forms the floor (0). In this section, we consider the team score
regardless of emissions savings.
As stated above, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 4a: Teams who use a model (whether given or cocreated) will reach agreements with higher
team scores than those who do not use a model.
Hypothesis 4b.1: Teams who cocreate a model will reach agreements with higher team scores than
those who use the given model.
Table 4
Results of Testing H3a, H3b.1, and H3b.2, and H3c: Ratio of Favorable Agreements for Comparisons of Model Use and Model
Authorship Categories
Comparison Ratio of favorable agreements Odds ratio p-value
H3a: Model used vs. no model used Model used 0.34
No model 0.27
1.40 0.4196
H3b.1: Cocreated vs. used given model Cocreated 0.44
Used given 0.25
2.36 0.0975*
H3b.2: Cocreated vs. no model used Cocreated 0.44
No model 0.27
2.16 0.2116
H3c: Used Given vs. no model used Used given 0.25
No model 0.27
0.918 0.6900
Note. Significance codes: **** = 0; *** = 0.001; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1
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Hypothesis 4b.2: Teams who cocreate models will reach agreements with higher team scores than
those who do not use a model.
Hypothesis 4c: Teams who use the given model will reach agreements with higher team scores than
those who do not use a model.
Figure 3 shows the scores of teams who used the given LCA model, who cocreated their own LCA,
and who did not use an LCA model. In this figure, the lowest visible outlier of the teams who used the
given LCA is an infeasible agreement. In this team, one party either miscalculated his or her score or
knowingly, possibly reluctantly, agreed to a score lower than his or her threshold. The only team not to
reach agreement did not use a model; this team is included in the data generating Figure 3, though the
scale of the axis does not display this team’s 0 points. Considering model use (using a model versus not
using a model), the mean score of teams using a model is 717 points compared to 682 points for teams
not using a model, offering only limited support for H4a. The difference in means is not significant
(W = 424.5, p = 0.402) in a one-sided asymptotic Wilcoxon rank sum test. Therefore, we find little sup-
port for H4a. The difference in variance between these two categories is significant (F = 0.049091,
numerator df = 58, denominator df = 14, p = 2.2 9 1016) in an F test to compare the variances. Note
that the variances are not directly visible in Figure 3.
The teams cocreating a model had the highest mean score (719 points), followed by teams using the
given model (716 points), offering limited support for H4b.1, but the difference in these means is not sig-
nificant (W = 399, p = 0.3057) in a one-sided exact Wilcoxon rank sum test. Furthermore, for H4b.2,
teams cocreating a model earned more points (719 points) than teams not using a model (682 points),
but again the difference in means is not significant in a one-sided exact Wilcoxon rank sum test. The
variance for these latter two categories is significantly different (F = 0.0514, numerator df = 26, denomi-
nator df = 14, p = 5.5 9 1010) in an F test.
For H4c, the difference in mean team scores between teams using the given model (mean: 716 points)
and teams not using a model (mean: 682 points) is not significant in a one-sided exact Wilcoxon rank
sum test (W = 223.5, p = 0.6572), but the difference in variance is significant (F test: F = 0.0486,
numerator df = 31, denominator df = 14, p = 1.5 9 1011). Therefore, we find limited but statistically
insignificant support for H4a, H4b.1, H4b.2, and H4c; we find strong evidence that the variances are sig-
nificantly different in H4a, H4b.2, and H4c (see Table 5).
Table 5
Results of Testing H4a, H4b.1, H4b.2, and H4c and Test of Variances: Team Scores for Comparisons of Model Use and Model
Authorship Categories
Comparison Means (in points)
Comparing means Comparing variances
W statistic p-value F statistic
Numerator
df
Denominator
df p-value
H4a: Model used vs.
no model used
Model used 717
No model 682
424.5 0.4015 0.049 58 14 2.2 9 1016****
H4b.1: Cocreated vs.
used given model
Cocreated 719
Used given 716
399 0.3057 0.9459 31 26 0.8746
H4b.2: Cocreated vs.
no model used
Cocreated 719
No model 682
201 0.5183 0.0514 26 14 5.5 9 1010****
H4c: Used given vs.
no model used
Used given 716
No model 682
223.5 0.6572 0.0486 31 14 1.5 9 1011****
Note. Significance codes: **** = 0; *** = 0.001; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1
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Alternative Explanations
To verify these results, we tested three alternate explanations: comfort with quantitative information;
assessment of trust among the parties; and assessment of role commitment to sustainability. First, we
tested whether participants self-selected into model use by nature of their comfort with quantitative
information. The participants’ self-reported quantitative comfort is not significantly different between
teams given a model and those not given a model (Welch two-sample t test: t = 1.1736, df = 276.94,
p = 0.2416); it is also not significantly different for teams that used a model versus those that did not use
a model (Welch two-sample t test: t = 0.091766, df = 83.185, p = 0.9271). Thus, quantitative comfort
is not an alternative explanation for the results found.
Additionally, we assessed whether the participants’ trust for the parties differed between teams given a
model versus those not given a model, or teams that used a model versus those that did not. Similarly,
we assessed whether the participants’ perception of the parties’ commitment to sustainability differed by
these categories. The differences in participants’ assessments are not significant—with the exception of
other parties’ trust for the composter—for the teams given versus not given a model nor for teams that
Table 6
Participants’ Ratings of Trust: t Statistics, df, and p-Values of Participant Ratings of Their Trust of the Information Shared by
Each Role
Given vs. not given Used vs. not used
t df p t df p
Trust of info coffee shared 1.3799 193.69 0.1692 0.1757 24.99 0.8619
Trust of info cup shared 1.3884 189.52 0.1667 0.7150 23.54 0.4817
Trust of info recycler shared 0.8993 185.4 0.3696 0.2658 24.73 0.7926
Trust of info composter shared 1.6915 190.61 0.0924* 1.1922 25.26 0.2443
Trust of info hauler shared 1.1006 177.43 0.2726 0.2469 25.05 0.807
Notes. None of the values are significant at better than 90% level, with the exception of trust for the composter in given versus
not given, which is significant at a 90% level.
Significance codes: **** = 0; *** = 0.001; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1
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Figure 3. Agreement value. Mean (diamond), median, and 25th and 75th percentiles for the model-use and authorship cate-
gories: used given LCA, cocreated LCA, and LCA not used. The model-use and authorship categories all had the same median
value (720). Teams cocreating their own LCA had the highest mean (719). The highest possible team score is 765 points.
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used versus those that did not use a model (see Table 6 for t statistics, df, and p-values by role for trust
ratings and Table 7 for a listing of t statistics, df, and p-values by role for ratings of commitment to sus-
tainability). Tables 6 and 7 use Welch two-sample t tests. Neither trust nor perceived commitment to
sustainability explains the results observed in this study.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study complements existing studies of collaborative model use (such as those by Videira, Antunes,
Santos, & Gamito, 2003; Videira, van den Belt, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito, 2004; and Beall & Zeoli,
2008) by utilizing a method that allows for repeated instances within the same context. Here, we used a
serious game role-play simulation wherein participants enact one of five roles negotiating together.
Approximately half of our 74 teams of five negotiators received a model. These repeated instances enable
us to provide quantitative information about how model use impacts the negotiation outcome and pro-
cess, and the ways models are used in sustainability negotiations.
This study was contextualized within a sustainability negotiation that contains a mixture of issues
involving negotiator preference and scientific information. We chose the particular case of recycling and/
or composting used paper coffee cups because it was ongoing in the real world, involved many parties all
wanting a sustainable outcome, and required that the parties address both preference-based and scientific
issues. In addition, we had access to real-world stakeholders while developing the role-play simulation.
We anticipate that models could be helpful in other types of negotiations, beyond sustainability, that also
require negotiators to grapple with both preferences and scientific information.
By allowing participants the freedom to use or not use an expert-provided model, to cocreate a model,
or to negotiate without a model, we were able to study the participants’ inclination toward using a model
in the negotiation and to compare the use of an expert-given model with that of a cocreated model.
Through surveys issued before and after the role-play simulation and interviews a few weeks later, we
gained more insight into the respective impacts of model use, model authorship, and the ways negotia-
tors use models while negotiating.
In the role-play simulation, more teams (80%) used a model than did not, even if they had to cocreate
the model themselves. This suggests that the negotiators found a model helpful in their negotiation pro-
cess and confirms the collaborative modeling research findings that model use can help sustainability
decision makers (see, for example, Tidwell & van den Brink, 2008). We quantify the potential magnitude
of this effect.
We found quantitative evidence that model use did not prolong the negotiation process. In fact, we
found some evidence that model use might speed up the negotiation: in our sample, on average, teams
Table 7
Participants’ Ratings of Roles’ Commitment to Sustainability: t Statistics, df, and p-Values of Participant Ratings of Role
Commitment to Sustainability
Given vs. not given Used vs. not used
t df p t df p
Coffee commitment to sustainability 1.2207 284.63 0.2232 0.0975 70.33 0.9226
Cup commitment to sustainability 0.51783 281.31 0.605 0.4013 79.25 0.6893
Recycler commitment to sustainability 1.5735 284.71 0.1167 1.518 65.00 0.134
Composter commitment to sustainability 0.1806 278.03 0.8568 0.6923 73.62 0.4909
Hauler commitment to sustainability 0.3426 282.26 0.7322 0.7663 75.92 0.4459
Notes. None of the values are significant at better than 90% level.
Significance codes: **** = 0; *** = 0.001; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1
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that used a model reached agreement faster than those that did not use a model. Even those teams that
had to cocreate a model while negotiating negotiated faster than teams that did not use a model. How-
ever, our analysis on negotiation duration shows that, statistically, the time it takes to negotiate using a
model compared to the time it takes to negotiate without a model is approximately the same. This is
important because a frequently stated reason for not using a negotiated decision making approach is
concern for how long it takes. Parties already concerned with a prolonged process might be unwilling to
add a component—such as a model—that might lengthen the process. Our results indicate that using a
model does not lengthen the negotiation, and in our sample of 74 teams of negotiators, model use sped
up the negotiation. Furthermore, we found that model use reduced the variance in negotiation time sig-
nificantly compared to not using a model; this could potentially allow negotiators to better plan their
negotiation process, with a more accurate estimate of how long it is likely to take. Quicker negotiations
also increase the likelihood that the negotiation will reach a conclusion rather than being aborted due to
a lengthy process. Situations where some parties are better off if no agreement is reached notwithstand-
ing, it is generally the case that an agreement must be reached for the group to take action toward
improving sustainability. Therefore, by not lengthening the negotiation duration—and potentially short-
ening it and thereby increasing the likelihood of a negotiated agreement—using a model in sustainability
negotiation can improve the chances of collective sustainability action.
This study demonstrates that using models to test alternatives while agreement building, rather than
to verify a tentative agreement, can lead to higher team scores more frequently. By exploring as they
negotiate, the negotiators can see more clearly the impact of each choice. Seeing the environmental
impact of alternatives considered can enable negotiators to create agreements that benefit the environ-
ment. Additionally, seeing the impact while negotiating allows the negotiators to identify which parties
lose value on which alternatives and to find potential areas to give more value to those parties. Finding
ways to convey more value is particularly pertinent if some parties lose value due to choices that protect
the environment. Rather than stopping the entire negotiation process, parties that lose on environmental
issues can gain enough on other issues to join the agreement, thus enabling collective environmental
action. Future studies could investigate these mechanisms directly.
Furthermore, the party with ownership of the expert-provided model—the cup maker—could have
used the model secretly for personal gain (rather than sharing it with the other negotiators in his or her
team). If he or she were using it for individual gain, we would expect the cup maker’s score overage to be
highest in teams that used the given model. However, there was no appreciable difference in the cup
maker’s score overage for teams using the given model and teams not using a model. In teams that used
the given model, the coffee retailer (convener of the negotiation) and, to a lesser extent, the cup maker
(owner of the model) were able to target agreements more precisely than the other roles in their team
and than those two roles in teams that cocreated a model or did not use a model.
Our study indicates that not only did model use help the negotiation process, but it also improved the
negotiated outcome. The model-using teams in our sample had a higher average team score and targeted
their agreements. Additionally, we found evidence that involving negotiators in model creation can
improve the negotiated outcome: Negotiators who cocreated a model reached the highest ratio of favor-
able agreements (agreements that either maximize the environmental protection or maximize the negoti-
ated value). These teams also had the highest mean team score in our sample, although statistically no
different than other teams. Therefore, cocreating a model offers the possibility of targeting more favor-
able agreements and could result in a team score as good as, if not better than, using a given model. The
strong performance of the teams cocreating their model supports the suggestion that researchers such as
van den Belt et al. (2013) have made to involve the parties in model development.
In addition to having the highest mean team score, negotiators cocreating a model had the second
largest variance. The large variance could potentially be related to the differences (including errors) in
the models they created. Contrasting with the variance of the teams that used the given model (the small-
est variance of the three categories) supports this reasoning because these teams used the same model as
Volume 9, Number 3, Pages 237–255 251
Czaika and Selin Taking Action to Reduce Waste
each other. Future research could test the relationship between model correctness and score variance by
giving some teams a correct model and other teams a model with an error in it. Teams that used the
given model had the smallest variance, indicating that they were able to consistently earn value in the
negotiation.
It is possible that there are other explanations besides model use and model authorship for the results
observed here. We measured several variables to help rule out some of these possible explanations. Our
evidence suggests that comfort with quantitative information, trust among the parties, and perceived
commitment to sustainability did not determine whether negotiators used a model or not and were not
aligned with whether they received a model or not.
While this serious gaming approach allows us to test repeated instances of the same sustainability con-
text, the role-play simulation constraints required that the physical world scenario be simplified. Further
research could explore the influence a more complex model has on negotiation duration, manner of
model usage, deliberate agreement choices, and team score. Ideally, the model complexity should be on
the level of those in case study and action research-based collaborative modeling studies (Beall & Zeoli,
2008; van den Belt et al., 2013; Videira, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito, 2003; Videira, van den Belt, Antunes,
Santos, & Gamito, 2004). Moreover, future research could investigate further the different manners of
model use. Such a study could also test whether model authorship reinforces the manner of model use in
impacting the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes. Additionally, future studies could investi-
gate why some teams of negotiators do not use a model, including looking at why some ignore a given
model and others do not cocreate a model. Future research can also investigate why parties that cocreate
a model while negotiating took no longer to negotiate, even though they split their time between negoti-
ating and cocreating the model.
Model use can help to explore the implications of various alternatives (Dowlatabadi, 1995; Morgan,
2011; and van Delden et al., 2011) within the negotiation. Furthermore, it provides a structure to the
dialogue (Tidwell & van den Brink, 2008; van den Belt, 2006). Exploring the various alternatives in a
structured fashion can help teams explore the solution space of the negotiation—the zone of potential
agreement—and identify the most favorable agreements. Future research can determine whether model
use impacts the agreements considered en route to the final agreement. In this study, we did not collect
data about the agreements considered by each team (only data about the agreement finally reached);
therefore, we cannot address the teams’ trajectory through the solution space. However, our findings do
show that model-using teams reached a smaller set of final agreements and that teams cocreating their
model reached more favorable agreements, which together indicate that model-cocreating teams were
better able to target their agreements.
Based on the results of this study, we find qualified support that using a model in sustainability
negotiations might help negotiators achieve more overall value more consistently and reach agree-
ments that are more protective of the environment, without lengthening the negotiation. Along with
other researchers (Langsdale et al., 2013; van den Belt, 2004; van den Belt et al., 2013; Videira,
Antunes, Santos, & Gamito, 2003; Videira, van den Belt, Antunes, Santos, & Gamito, 2004; among
others), we further suggest that the way models are used and who creates them might be more impor-
tant than just having a model. Teams cocreating their own model reached the highest ratio of favor-
able agreements (value maximizing or maximizing the environmental protection). Teams that used
the model to test alternatives as they were negotiating reached higher scores than those using the
model to verify a tentative agreement. In aggregate, the results of this study suggest the importance of
model use—especially models collaboratively built by the negotiators—in sustainability negotiations.
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